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A general conceptual framework 
for case studies 
Benny Widyono* 
This article presents in some detail a 
general conceptual framework intended to 
provide guidelines for the study of ne-
gotiations between governments and 
transnational corporations in connexion 
with export-oriented primary commo-
dities. If the developing countries have 
greatly improved their bargaining position 
vis-a-vis the transnational corporations 
during the past few decades, this is due 
not only to changes in economic and 
political power relations at the world 
level but also to the pooling of increasing-
ly detailed knowledge of all the factors 
which strengthen the hand of the govern-
ments in their dealings with the corpo-
rations. 
The agreement concluded in each 
specific case between transnational cor-
porations and governments depends upon 
a constellation of interrelated factors, 
pre-eminent among which are certain 
economic, political and administrative 
characteristics of the host countries, the 
nature of the commodity concerned and 
its world market, the basic features of the 
corporation, and the international 
scenario in which the negotiation is con-
ducted. After describing these factors, the 
author shows the complexities of the 
negotiation process, the various types of 
pacts and agreements that have been 
established, the direct and indirect gains 
to which they give rise and the ways in 
which the host country can participate in 
these. 
*The author was formerly a staff member 
of the CEPAL/CTC Joint Unit on Transnational 
Corporations, Economic Development Division, 
CEPAL. He is now Chief, ESCAP/CTC Joint 
Unit on Transnational Corporations in Bang-
kok. 
A. Introduction* 
In July 1977, an aide-memoire was 
signed between Mr. Enrique Iglesias and 
Mr. J.B.P. Maramis, the Executive Secre-
taries of CEPAL and ESCAP, respec-
tively, dealing with the possibilities for 
regional co-operation between the two 
regional commissions in the field of 
transnational corporations.1 In this 
aide-memoire, the two Executive Secre-
taries agreed to co-operate in the con-
duct of case studies on the involvement 
of transnational corporations in export-
oriented primary commodities of inte-
rest to both regions. Provision was made 
for the gradual extension of this co-ope-
ration to other interested regional 
commissions. 
It was agreed that all case studies 
should have a common focus and should 
concentrate on the specific issues 
surrounding the following two areas of 
concern: 
(1) Factors determining the rela-
tive bargaining positions of 
host governments and trans-
national corporations; 
(2) The resulting structure of dis-
tribution of gains between the 
host countries and transnatio-
nal corporations. 
The emphasis in the case studies will 
therefore be on the bargaining process 
between the two parties concerned. It is 
* The author wishes to express his grati-
tude to Mr. Aníbal Pinto, Director, Economic 
Development Division of CEPAL, for his con-
tinuous guidance and advice. 
1
 Aide-memoire between the Executive Se-
cretaries of CEPAL and ESCAP on Interregio-
nal Co-operation among Regional Commissions 
in the field of Transnational Corporations, 
Geneva, 26 July 1977. 
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believed that the interplay of several key 
factors in the government's bargaining 
position will be very important in deter-
mining the outcome of the negotiations. 
These in turn will result in an agreement 
which determines the structure of the 
distribution of gains accruing from ex-
ports of primary commodities. 
The dimension and complexities of 
the problems vary from country to 
country, from commodity to commo-
dity and from project to project. Gene-
ralized policy recommendations to host 
governments are, therefore, difficult to 
formulate at the present stage and will 
have to await the accumulation of 
enough evidence from case studies being 
undertaken by researchers in different 
parts of the world and for as many 
commodities as possible. The underlying 
approach to the case studies to be 
carried out in this interregional project 
will, therefore, be that of descriptive 
pragmatism rather than prescription. In 
order to provide a common focus and 
aim to all the case studies, a general 
conceptual framework applicable to all 
case studies has been developed and is 
presented in this paper. It has been kept 
very broad in order to accommodate the 
multifarious conditions and situations 
which exist in the industry. It will also 
be applicable to renegotiations and to 
negotiations associated with nationa-
lization of a given production facility 
operating in the country. 
1. Transnational corporations and 
exports of primary commodities 
In spite of the rapid increase during 
recent years in manufactured exports 
from a few selected developing coun-
tries, primary commodities continue to 
figure prominently in developing coun-
tries' exports.2 For the developing 
countries as a whole, the share of ex-
ports of primary commodities in total 
exports was 84.7 per cent in 1975. 
Petroleum accounted for 60.9 per cent 
in 1975, as compared to 28.3 per cent in 
I960.3 
Concomitant with the above pheno-
menon has been the slow growth of 
primary commodity exports in relation 
to other exports. During 1950-1975, in 
terms of current prices exports showed 
the following annual rates of growth: 
foodstuffs and raw materials, 7.3 per 
cent; fuels, 14 per cent; and manufac-
tures, 12.7 per cent. In terms of constant 
prices, the percentages are as follows: 
foodstuffs and raw materials, 4.2 per 
cent; fuels, 6.8 per cent; and manufac-
tures, 8.3 per cent. The declining share 
of foodstuffs and raw materials in total 
exports during the period is reflected in 
the decreasing importance of such pro-
ducts in world exports. During the 
period, the share of food and raw ma-
terials declined from 46.4 per cent to 19 
per cent, whereas that of fuels increased 
from 9.9 per cent to 18.6 per cent and 
that of manufactures from 43.7 per cent 
to 60.4 percent.4 
It is generally recognized that such 
factors as rapid technological progress, 
reducing demand for raw materials as a 
proportion of total demand through 
2
 Throughout this paper, commodities are 
defined as those in SITC categories 0 to 4 (inc.) 
and 68 (non-ferrous metals). 
3
 International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), Report N° 
EC-166/77, Commodity Trade and Price 
Trends, August 1977. 
4
 These shares are for exports in current 
prices. Source: CEPAL, The economic and 
social development and external relations of 
Latin America, b;/CIiPAL/1024f Santiago, Chile 
(mimeographed text), 15 March 1977. 
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technological innovations, with, in 
advanced countries, the development of 
synthetic raw materials and the rapid 
increase of food production, rising prices 
of manufactured goods because of in-
flation and restrictive import policies, 
are among the most important deter-
minants of the above trends. 
Structurally, primary-exporter coun-
tries receive only a small fraction of the 
final prices paid for their commodities 
by consumers and by manufacturers in 
importing countries. It has been roughly 
estimated that final consumers pay over 
200 billion dollars (excluding taxes) for 
the developing countries' major primary 
exports, excluding oil (after further 
processing, packaging and advertising); 
but the exporter countries receive only 
30 billion dollars; or roughly one-seventh 
of the total.5 The spread is largest for 
commodities requiring complicated pro-
cessing techniques. For example, 4 to 5 
tons of bauxite worth between 40 and 
80 dollars will yield 1 ton of primary 
aluminum metal worth 700-800 dollars, 
and this in turn will yield semimanu-
factured products worth between 1,000 
and 1,500 dollars.6 Even for foodstuffs 
exports requiring little further pro-
cessing, there is a considerable spread 
between export value f.o.b. and con-
sumer prices. Banana-exporting coun-
tries, for instance, receive in gross export 
revenues between 12 per cent and 30.8 
per cent of the retail consumer price in 
Italy and in the United States, respec-
tively.7 
5
 See Mahbub Ul Haq, "The Third World 
and the International Economic Order", Tur-
keyen Lectures, Georgetown,Guyana, 1975. 
6
 See Norman Girvan, Corporate Impe-
rialism: Conflict and Expropriation, New York, 
M.E. Sharpe, 1976, p. 101. 
7See l'AO, Committee on Commodity 
Problems, "Review of the economic asnects of 
International efforts to improve the 
economic performance of developing 
countries which rely heavily on primary 
commodity exports have recently been 
intensified in many international forums 
and by producer associations. The strug-
gles of the developing countries have 
centred around demands for such measu-
res as the linking of the prices of raw 
materials to those of manufactured 
goods, the stabilization of raw material 
prices and of the incomes of developing 
primary-exporter countries, the removal 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the 
increasing of the export price of specific 
commodities. 
While all these international efforts 
directed at improving raw material prices 
and access to markets will undoubtedly 
benefit the developing countries which 
depend on primary commodity exports, 
a comprehensive and long-run solution 
to the problems faced by such countries 
will have to be found by placing primary 
commodity problems in the wider 
context of the international marketing 
of such commodities, and by examining 
the overall structure of the distribution 
of gains from such activities, i.e., the 
entire operational chain from the pro-
ducer to the consumer. To this end, 
international efforts will have to be 
complemented by national efforts aimed 
at altering the distribution of gains8 in 
favour of the developing exporter 
country. These national policy measures 
should be directed at two different 
production, trade and distribution of bananas", 
CCP:BA 75/8, April, 1975. 
8
 This paper will concentrate on the eco-
nomic or monetary gains derived from the 
export trade, and will leave aside such other 
effects of foreign investment activities as are 
felt, for example, in employment and at the 
cultural level. 
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stages of the process. One is the distri-
bution of gains from a given f.o.b. 
export value. The second set of policies 
are directed towards increasing the value 
added from exports, either through 
forward linkage operations from primary 
commodity exports to capture a larger 
share of the overall gains from such 
exports, or through a rise in the unit 
value of exports (as in the OPEC case, 
for example). 
Since the overall gains from primary 
commodity exports are closely linked to 
the operations of transnational corpo-
rations, the key to understanding the 
structure of these global gains lies in an 
analysis of the nature and operations of 
these transnationals and of their impact 
on the economic development of pro-
ducer countries. 
Through their global network of 
subsidiaries and associated companies, 
linked together by an intricate system of 
common financial, managerial, techno-
logical and organizational services, a 
small number of transnational corpo-
rations continue to exercise control, 
directly or indirectly, over the crucial 
stages of the operational chain of most 
primary commodity exports, from ex-
ploration to production, processing, 
exportation, transport, marketing, dis-
t r ibu t ion and financing. Complex 
constellations of horizontal and vertical 
integration have been established by 
transnational corporations in primary 
commodity exports, especially in the 
mining sector, often producing oligopo-
listic structures in the markets for these 
commodities. 
During the past twenty years or so, 
there has been a marked decline in the 
degree and extent of the control 
exercised by transnational corporations 
over export activities in respect of many 
commodities. An important factor con-
tributing to this trend is the strength-
ening of the bargaining power of host 
governments and the mutually rein-
forcing policies introduced by them to 
improve the distribution of gains in their 
favour. 
Host governments have at their 
disposal a series of policy instruments 
with which they can attempt to shift the 
international distribution of gains in 
favour of their countries. They may 
renegotiate the terms of the agreement 
and fiscal concessions, levy royalties and 
taxes, or require the expansion of pur-
chases of goods and services and of 
processing activities in the host country; 
finally, they can assert sovereignty over 
natural resources by partial or total 
nationalization of subsidiaries of trans-
national corporations operating in the 
country. It goes without saying that host 
governments' policy instruments are not 
mutually exclusive and that one policy 
measure may reinforce another. Inter-
nationally, the emergence of many firms 
independent of the oligopoly in each 
commodity has enabled host govern-
ments to widen their options and to 
purchase independently the services 
formerly available only in the package 
called direct investment. These services 
include technology, management, mar-
keting and distribution. 
2. Criteria for the selection 
of case studies 
The selection of specific commodity-
country combinations for the case 
studies to be carried out in the project 
under discussion, on the basis of the 
general conceptual framework developed 
in the present paper, is guided by the 
following criteria: 
a) The commodity selected should 
be of export interest to several countries 
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in Latin America and preferably in Asia. 
If this project is extended to other 
regions, the criterion will naturally be 
expanded to include other commodities 
of specific interest to Africa and West 
Asia. Statistically, therefore, commo-
dities selected must figure prominently 
in the exports of the countries con-
cerned. Secondly, the countries selected 
must make an important contribution to 
the world supply of exports of the 
commodity in question; 
b) The degree and extent to which 
transnational corporations exercise con-
trol -whether directly or indirectly-
over the production and marketing of 
the commodity concerned must be signi-
ficant. Since indirect control over the 
marketing of the commodity is included, 
most of the commodities exported by 
developing Asia and Latin America can 
qualify for selection as objects of case 
studies. Even if production is in the 
hands of smallholders, as is the case with 
certain agricultural export commodities, 
the final business of marketing and 
distribution in the consumer countries is 
conducted by a handful of transnational 
corporations; 
c) Recent government policies vis-a-
vis transnational corporations in respect 
of the commodity selected must have 
yielded substantial improvements in the 
gains accruing to the host governments 
concerned. This criterion is adopted 
because it is believed that case studies 
describing such successful host govern-
ment action will enable other govern-
ments trying to improve the gains from 
primary exports to move up on the 
'learning curve' of bargaining power. 
Using these three criteria as a basis, 
case studies were undertaken by CEPAL, 
the possibilities of expanding them to 
Asia and eventually to Africa being kept 
in mind. The three case studies selected 
were; tin in Bolivia, bauxite-aluminum in 
the Caribbean (specifically in Jamaica, 
Guyana and Surinam), and bananas in 
Central America and Panama. In all three 
cases, the gains from the commodity 
exports concerned have been shifted 
substantially in favour of host countries 
as a result of changes in the policies of 
host governments. This satisfies criterion 
(c) outlined above. These case studies 
will incorporate, whenever possible and 
appropriate, data on the experience of 
South-east Asian countries exporting 
identical commodities and involved with 
the same transnational corporations. The 
comparison of different control rela-
tionships maintained by the same trans-
national corporations in various parts of 
the world will contribute further to the 
accumulation of case study evidence in 
this still largely unexplored area of 
research. Since all three commodities are 
exported in significant quantities by 
certain African countries as well, the 
extension of the study to that region will 
obviously increase the validity of the 
conclusions reached. 
Criterion (a) was met as follows. 
During 1973-1975, tin represented 41.3 
per cent of total Bolivian exports. The 
corresponding figures for bananas were: 
Costa Rica, 27.1 per cent; Honduras, 
22.3 per cent; and Panama, 27.8 per 
cent; while those for bauxite were: 
Guyana, 19.6 per cent; Surinam, 24.2 
per cent; and Jamaica, 19.4 per cent. 
Another criterion is the importance 
of the country's exports in total world 
exports of the commodity. During 
1973-1975, Bolivia accounted for 14 per 
cent of world exports of tin, being the 
second largest exporter of tin after Ma-
laysia. The corresponding figures for 
bananas were: Costa Rica, 16 per cent; 
Honduras, 8.3 per cent; and Panama, 8.2 
per cent. The percentages for bauxite 
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were: Guyana, 9.5 per cent; Surinam, 
10.2 per cent; and Jamaica, 23.3 per 
cent. During the same period, the Latin 
American and Caribbean region's share 
in world exports of the three commo-
dities was: bananas, 75.2 per cent; 
bauxite, 47.2 per cent; and tin, 15.4 per 
cent. The corresponding shares of de-
veloping countries in Asia were: bananas, 
10.7 per cent; bauxite, 5.6 per cent; and 
tin, 58.5 percent.9 
Criterion (b) concerns the degree and 
extent of control exercised by trans-
national corporations over the commo-
dity concerned. Although recent govern-
ment policies are introducing significant 
changes in patterns of ownership and 
control, transnational corporations are 
still dominant in the bauxite-aluminum 
and banana sectors of the Caribbean and 
the Central American isthmus, respecti-
vely, and, for that matter, in those of 
South-east Asia and Africa. 
Six vertically-integrated trans-
national corporations control the bulk of 
the world aluminum industry. The four 
largest operate in Jamaica: the Alumi-
num Company of America (ALCOA); 
the Aluminum Company of Canada, 
ALCAN Aluminum Limited; the Rey-
nolds Metals Company; and the Kaiser 
Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, 
along with two others which are impor-
tant in the copper industry: Revere and 
Anaconda. ALCOA also operates in Su-
rinam and the Dominican Republic, 
whereas Reynolds is active in Haiti. In 
Surinam, the other important producer 
is Billiton, a Dutch transnational cor-
poration which has its origin in the 
Indonesian tin industry and is still im-
portant in the tin industry of Thailand. 
ALCOA also explores for bauxite in 
Indonesia, while the Malaysian pro-
duction is owned by ALCAN. 
In the banana economy of the Cen-
tral American Isthmus, three transna-
tional corporations from the United 
States dominate the scene, although 
often operating through associate pro-
ducers. These three companies are: 
United Brands (a merger between the 
United Fruit Company and AMK Cor-
poration); Castle and Cook (parent 
company of Standard Fruit); and Del 
Monte Corporation. Together with the 
Japanese transnational Sumitono, they 
cont ro l Philippine banana exports 
through a system of associate producers 
and market control.10 
The tin industry has been selected 
because of the dynamic modifications 
which have occurred in the control 
exerted by transnational corporations 
over the industry, especially since World 
War II. The tin industry has always been 
relatively unstructured, and has not been 
dominated on a worldwide basis by 
fully-integrated companies, as is the fa-
miliar pattern in other non-ferrous me-
tals. 
The nationalization of the three 
largest companies in Bolivia in 1952 and 
of the Billiton Company in Indonesia in 
1957 has further significantly weakened 
the control of transnational corporations 
over the industry (Bolivia and Indonesia 
are respectively the second and third 
largest producers of tin in the world). 
The Indonesian State monopoly in tin, 
P.T. Timah, and the Bolivian mining 
corporation (Corporación Minera de Bo-
livia - COMIBOL) -which accounted 
for 75 per cent of Bolivia's tin exports in 
1975- are now the two largest com-
9Source: IBRD, Commodity Trade and 10Data obtained from annual reports of 
Price Trends, op, cit., tables 19 to 22. companies and government sources. 
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panies in the world.11 More recently, in 
1976, control over the world's remaining 
largest transnational corporation pro-
ducing tin (the London Tin Corpo-
ration), with production in Nigeria, Ma-
laysia, Thailand and Australia, passed 
into the hands of PERNAS, a holding 
company owned by the Government of 
Malaysia. This was brought about 
through a successful take-over bid for 
the parent company in London and the 
transfer of the company headquarters to 
Malaysia.12 
Control over the smelting of tin, 
which in turn influences the marketing 
of the metal by transnational corpo-
rations, is also diminishing rapidly. The 
State enterprises in Bolivia and Indonesia 
are expanding their tin smelting capacity 
and will soon smelt all their domestic 
production. The world's largest tin-
smelting transnational corporation is 
Amalgamated Metal Corporation (a 
1976 merger between Consolidated Tin 
Smelters and Amalgated Metal Corpo-
ration), which owns smelting facilities in 
Nigeria, Malaysia and Australia. AMC is 
controlled by Patino N.V., which also 
owns a tin smelter and production faci-
This section presents the general outline 
for the study. Central to this outline is 
the bargaining framework depicted in 
diagram 1, which shows the relationships 
among the various elements entering into 
1 1
 Excluding the People's Republic of Chi-
na. 
12
 Government sources for Bolivia and In-
donesia. On the PERNAS take-over story, see: 
Andrew Davenport, "Bargaining for Vital Tin 
Stakes", Far Eastern Economic Review, April 
1, 1977; "Country Profile". Asian Finance, 
April-May 1977. 
lities in Brazil. The Williams Harvey tin 
smelter in England, owned by AMC, 
which formerly smelted the bulk of 
Bolivian tin, was closed down in 1974.13 
Finally, the three commodities se-
lected provide good examples of how 
co-operation and concerted efforts 
among producer countries can improve 
the bargaining position of each host 
government. The concerted action taken 
through the International Bauxite Asso-
ciation and the Union of Banana-
Expor t ing Countr ies considerably 
enhanced the bargaining power of the 
producer countries. Although the Inter-
national Tin Agreement, which is now 
entering upon its fifth phase with the 
recent ratification by Bolivia,14 em-
braces both producer and consumer 
countries, the producer countries have 
frequently been able to join forces to 
serve their common interest in the Inter-
national Tin Council, the executive arm 
of the Agreement. The tin agreements 
have above all been successful in exerting 
a stabilizing influence in the tin market, 
dominated as it is often is by speculative 
elements. 
the bargaining process and determining 
its outcome. The framework has been 
drawn up on simple lines so that it can 
be applied to all cases under study. At 
13
 United States Bureau of Mines, "Tin", 
Mineral Facts and Problems, Washington, D.C., 
1975; Walter Skinner's Mining International 
Yearbook, London, The Financial Times, 1975, 
1976 and 1977 issues: company reports; 
William Fox, Tin: The Working of a Com-
modity Agreement, London, Mining Journal 
Books, 1974. 
14Metals Week, 20 June 1977, p. 3. 
B. The bargaining framework 
Diagram 1 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN PRIMARY COMMODITY EXPORTS: ELEMEN1 
THE BARGAINING 
SITUATION 
The relative bargaining positions of 
host governments and TNCs are 
shaped by a process of mutual 
interaction among the following four 
sets of factors: 
THE BARGAINING 
PROCESS 
The terms and conditions of the 
agreement are the subject of negotia-
tions between the two negotiating 
parties, influenced by international 
institutions. 
Ai The host government and related 
factors 
A2 The TNC and related factors 
A3 The commodity and related fac-
tors 




Bargaining j , 
Position 






B 2 The TNC 
IN THE BARGAINING FRAMEWORK 
C 
THE AGREEMENT AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF GAINS 
There are three types of agreements: 
(a) the specific contract (e.g., mining 
contract) 
(b) the standard contract (e.g., a 
forestry concession) 
(c) the implicit agreement (e.g., pro-
jects operating under general in-
vestment laws). 
In all cases, the host government is 
interested in improving the distribu-
tion of gains in its favour at the 
following two levels: 
C1 The traditional agreement: 
increasing the value retained from 
a given export value f.o.b. 
C2 The contemporary agreement: 
increasing the export value f.o.b. 
through: 
(1) increasing the value added 
from forward linkage opera-
tions such as processing, shipp-
ing, marketing; 
(2) increasing the unit value 
f.o.b. (e.g., the OPEC case) 
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the same time, it introduces into the 
situation a dimension of continuous 
change which will make it possible to 
analyse changes in host-government/ 
transnational-corporation relationships 
over time. 
In the bargaining framework it is 
assumed that both the host government 
and the transnational corporation are 
interested in maximizing their respective 
gains from the potential project (or the 
existing project in the case of renegotia-
tions), and that therefore the bargaining 
process plays an important role in the 
determination of the distribution of gains. 
The negotiations between the two 
parties concerned take place in a certain 
bargaining situation in which both 
parties are equipped with their respective 
bargaining capacity. The relative bar-
gaining capacity of each party is 
determined by a process of mutual 
interaction among numerous factors, 
which have been grouped in four sets in 
box A of diagram 1. In a particular 
bargaining situation, negotiations will 
commence between the two interested 
parties, under the influence of interna-
tional institutions (diagram 1, box B). 
There are three types of agreements. 
In the case of an important mining 
project involving hundreds of millions of 
dollars, the pertinent negotiations may 
entail years of hard bargaining, resulting 
in a formal specific contract. In other 
cases, where the procedures have been 
standardized, no formal negotiations 
may be conducted at all and the 
company may start operations after 
signing a standard contract. Thirdly, a 
company may enter operation under 
general laws applicable to foreing invest-
ment projects, i.e., the agreement is 
implicit. The formal or implicit agree-
ment concluded will form the basis of 
the distribution of gains among the 
transnational corporation, the host go-
vernment and the other parties con-
cerned (see diagram 1, box C). 
Box C of diagram 1 distinguishes 
between two levels of agreements: the 
traditional agreement, which concerns 
itself with the distribution of the 
proceeds from gross value of exports 
alone; and the contemporary agreement, 
which is concerned with the overall 
distribution of benefits from commodity 
exports, i.e., from the final consumer 
value of such exports, including the 
margins accruing to shipping, processing, 
manufacturing, distribution and mar-
keting. The distribution of gains can also 
be improved by simultaneously raising 
the unit value of exports and the retail 
consumer price. Both the producer 
country and the transnational corpora-
tion will gain at the expense of the 
consumer, as, for example, in the OPEC 
case. 
As the name suggests, the contempo-
rary agreement evolved from the tradi-
tional agreement. However, as the 
process of change is not uniform for all 
commodities and all countries, there are 
countries today which still allow transna-
tional corporations to operate under a 
traditional agreement. 
The actual distribution of gains 
depends on the process of implementa-
tion of the project, in which the 
transnational corporation executes the 
project and the government exercises its 
regulatory and control functions. A 
further complication is that the actual 
distribution may differ considerably 
from what was agreed on paper. In the 
case of an implicit agreement, automatic 
renegotiations will take place to adjust 
the provisions originally agreed upon. 
Where a formal contract is involved, 
however, renegotiations are more com-
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plicated and will result in a new 
agreement. 
Since the evolution of the different 
types of agreements and the implications 
for the distribution of gains are closely 
associated with the changes in the 
bargaining power of the two parties 
concerned, it is useful at this stage to 
examine in greater detail the four sets of 
factors which appear in diagram 1, box 
A. 
1. The bargaining situation 
(box A) 
A tabulation of the main elements 
entering into each of the four sets of 
factors that determine the bargaining 
situation is presented below. The list is 
by no means exhaustive, but it includes 
what are considered to be the important 
elements in each set. 
(a) The host government and related 
factors (A
 Y) 
(i) Political factors 
- Degree of independence 
and links with politico-
economic groupings; 
- Political philosophy of the 
government, especially its 
attitude towards foreign 
capital investment; 
- Stability and strength of 
the government and the 
extent of its authority 
throughout the country; 
- Foreign penetration and 
control over various sectors 
of production in the coun-
try concerned. 
(ii) Administrative factors and legal 
framework 
- Quality of the bureau-
cracy: skills and efficiency; 
the role of education and 
training; 
— Skills and experience in 
negotiations with transna-
tional corporations; 
— Qualifications of technical 
cadres for running cor-
porate functions indepen-
dently; 
— Extent of information avai-
lable to the public adminis-
tration on the industry and 
the corporation concerned, 
as well as on terms and 
conditions imposed by 
other host governments; 
— Extent of information avai-
lable on the relationship of 
the transnational corpora-
tion with the home govern-
ment and institutions like 
the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation (OPIC) 
or the Export-Import Bank 
(EXIMBANK); 
The laws and regulations of 
the country, especially 
those pertaining to foreign 
investment. 
(iii) Economic factors 
Dependence on foreign 
exchange earnings from 
exports in general, and 
from the commodity con-
cerned in particular; the 
degree of export diversifi-
cation; 
Position of the country in 
world trade in the commo-
dity concerned; 
Position of the country in 
world production and re-
serves of the commodity 
concerned; 
The proportion of the 
commodity exported in re-
lation to the host country's 
production; 
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- Relationships with interna-
tional economic systems; 
- Economic and financial 
dependency; balance of pay-
ments and debt position, 
etc. 
(b) The transnational corporation and 
related factors (A2) 
(i) International control relation-
ships 
- Structure of the oligopoly: 
degree of vertical and hori-
zontal integration and con-
trol over production and 
exports, shipping, pro-
cessing, marketing and dis-
tribution; 
- Existence of cartel arrange-
ments, including gentle-
man's agreements, in the 
industry; 
- Oligopoly dynamics : 
weakening of the oligopoly 
through emergence of inde-
pendent firms in the indus-
try; 
- Position of the particular 
transnational corporation 
in the industry: share in 
markets, raw material sup-
plies, production and pro-
cessing capacity; 
- Corporate strategies in res-
pect of global control over 
raw material supplies; 
- Necessity of securing a 
'hurdle rate' of return; i.e., 
a risk-adjusted minimum 
acceptable internal rate of 
return. 
(ii) Relationships with the host 
country concerned 
~ Structure of the transna-
tional corporation in the 
host country: 
• status of subsidiary 
(-ies) in the system); 
• related and associated 
companies through in-
terlocking director-
ships and management 
and technology con-
tracts; 
— Transnational mobility of 
the corporation: 
• dependence on raw 
materials from the par-
ticular host country 
and possibilities of 
shifting to other sour-
ces of supply; 
• debt/equity factors in 
the investment project; 
• investment planned or 
already placed in host 
country concerned; 
— Home country support for 
the corporation. 
(c) The nature of the commodity (A3) 
(i) Trends in demand and supply, 
including projections of such 
trends. Importance of trade in 
world production of the com-
modity; 
(ii) Trends in demand for and 
supply of substitutes; 
(iii) Income- and price-elasticities 
and elasticity of substitution; 
(iv) Market structure. Importance 
of formal markets and of 
arm's-length trading versus in-
tra-company transactions; 
(v) Geographic concentration of 
countries in production, pro-
cessing, trading and consump-
tion of the commodity; 
(vi) Nature and structure of the 
industry. Proportion represen-
ted by export value of primary 
commodities in final consumer 
value in importing country; 
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(vii) Dynamics of resource disco-
very and, in the case of 
minerals, trends in reserves 
related to current production; 
(viii) The trend towards massive size 
in mining projects: increasing 
capital investment required per 
metric ton of production of the 
specific commodity concerned. 
(d) The international setting (AA) 
(i) World political order: post-
world-war political emancipa-
tion and decolonization. 
(ii) World economic order 
- The calls for economic 
emancipation to accom-
pany political indepen-
dence, culminating in 
demands for a New Interna-
tional Economic Order; 
and on the other hand, the 
steadily-growing power of 
transnational corporations 
in all spheres; 
- The role of international 
institutions: United Na-
tions agencies (especially 
UNCTAD), IMF, IBRD, 
etc.; 
International commodity 
agreements, e.g., the Inter-
national Tin Agreement; 
- Producers' associations, 
e.g., Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), International Bau-
xite Association, Union of 
Banana-Exporting Coun-
tries, Association of Natu-
ral Rubber-Producing Coun-
tries; 
- Multipolarization of the 
world economy; 
- Preferential schemes ex-
tended to a particular 
group of countries by cer-
tain importer countries and 
other policies imposed by 
consumer/importer coun-
tries; 
— Potential or real sanctions 
imposed by home govern-
ments and/or international 
institutions on countries 
which embark on policies 
such as expropriation. 
(e) Shaping the bargaining situation 
It would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to assign meaningful values 
or weights to the above factors, most of 
which are qualitative in nature. Moreo-
ver, although in the short run many 
factors are assumed to be constant, in 
the long run they all vary, which creates 
a climate of continuous change and 
often tension in the bargaining situation. 
Until a more rigorous general theory 
on the bargaining framework including 
both qualitative and quantitative factors 
has been developed, the most reasonable 
approach would appear to be to carry 
out case studies, which is the methodolo-
gy adopted in this project15 The 
foregoing catalogue will then act purely 
as a checklist. Thus, an appreciation of 
what matters might be formed by 
looking at otherwise very smilar cases in 
different countries or industries or in the 
same industry at different points of 
time. It is believed that the accumulation 
of such case study evidence will enable 
other host governments to apply similar 
strategies in respect of transnational 
corporations operating in their countries. 
Although as a general rule the 
improvement of a host government's 
15
 Of course, many rigorous bargaining 
models exist, in which the non-qualitative 
factors are ignored or assumed to be constant. 
None of these will have an operational value in 
the approach presented in this paper. 
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bargaining power will automatically 
weaken the other party, there are cases 
where the zero sum of game theory does 
not apply, as both parties can increase 
the gains to be distributed through 
jointly-conceived strategies. The petro-
leum price hike is, of course, the most 
obvious example, whereby both host 
governments and transnational corpora-
tions increased their benefits by jointly 
capturing the consumer surplus. 
Broadly speaking, transnational cor-
porations are almost by definition able 
to capture a larger share of profits 
through their structural and inherent 
characteristics. Their unique advantages 
include their transnational mobility and 
their control over vital resources, which 
in turn gives them control over the 
crucial stages in the export of primary 
commodities; their strong point is their 
very 'transnational-ness', a characteristic 
which governments in particular do not 
possess. 
The TNC subsidiary's strength lies in 
the large central expenditure borne by 
the corporation as a whole, and not 
necessarily by a particular subsidiary. 
Through their heavy expenditure (on 
exploration, advertising and marketing, 
or on research and development),16 
TNCs control most turnstiles of entry to 
the industry. Depending on where the 
key scale factors are, and where heavy 
expenditure is made, the crucial turns-
tiles of entry will be located either after 
the production stage, as in the case of 
bananas (and other tropical agricultural 
products), tin, bauxite and iron ore, or 
else at the production and exploration 
stage, as in the case of petroleum, 
copper, nickel and natural gas. 
16
 Paul Streeten, "Policies Towards Multi-
nationals", World Development, vol. 3, no. 6, 
June 1975, pp. 393-397. 
Accordingly, the oil and copper 
companies that are challenged by econo-
mic nationalism in the countries where 
the wells and mines are located cannot 
easily capture oligopoly control at a later 
stage. In the cases where oligopoly 
control is strong at the post-production 
stage, on the other hand, TNCs may 
continue to maintain it even if produc-
tion facilities are nationalized.17 
Despite the difficulty of assigning 
values or weights to the factors in the list 
above, one can make certain generaliza-
tions about the magnitude and intensity 
of the impact of each factor on the 
relative bargaining power of host govern-
ments and transnational corporations. 
Ceteris paribus, from the standpoint 
of the structure of transnational corpora-
tions, a country owning a resource for 
which substitutes are readily available is 
de facto in a weaker position than the 
owner of the sole source of a material, 
and the latter's position is stronger if it 
does not depend on that resource alone 
for its export revenue. 
In a given host country, a transna-
tional corporation which depends to a 
large extent on raw materials from that 
country will be in a weaker position than 
other corporations which have a more 
diversified resource pattern. The ability 
of host governments to play off one 
company against another will depend on 
the oligopoly dynamics, which differ 
from commodity to commodity. In 
commodities in which the control of the 
few dominant companies is constantly 
being challenged by the proliferation of 
new independent companies, host go-
1 7
 Theodore H. Moran, "Transnational 
Strategies of Protection and Defense by 
Multinational Corporations: Spreading the risk 
and raising the cost for nationalization in 
natural resources", International Organization, 
vol. 27, no. 2, Spring 1973. 
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vernments will be in a better position to 
bargain than in cases where a handful of 
companies control the crucial technolo-
gy or marketing of the commodity. 
Host governments possessing few 
bargaining skills or first-hand experience, 
owing to the absence of qualified 
personnel and lack of information about 
the market, will be able to take 
advantage of the knowledge and exper-
ience of other countries which have been 
successful in concluding contracts favou-
rable to them or in renegotiating existing 
contracts. Concerted action and solida-
rity among host countries will automati-
cally strengthen individual positions, 
whereas lack of solidarity will allow 
corporations to play off one country 
against another.18 Although all transna-
tional corporations are by definition able 
to move easily across national boun-
daries, when it comes to mineral 
exploitation the corporations with mine-
ral reserves in many parts of the world 
will be placed at an advantage over 
companies with limited resource mobili-
ty. In this connexion it should be 
remembered that in both the successful 
instances of concerted action by pro-
ducer countries, i.e., in respect of 
petroleum and bauxite, the initiative was 
taken by a group of countries with 
similar problems and interests: the Arab 
countries in the case of oil and the 
Caribbean countries in the case of 
bauxite. 
18
 After having succeeded in raising 
revenues from bauxite exports by 600 per cent 
in 1974, the Jamaican Government sent out 
missions to other bauxite-producing countries, 
which introduced similar levies. Solidarity 
benefited all parties. The other countries took 
advantage of Jamaican skills and knowledge in 
planning their strategies, while Jamaica's 
position was strengthened by concerted action 
on the part of other producers. 
The market structure of the com-
modity is an important determinant of 
the bargaining power of host govern-
ments. In the absence of an open market 
for the commodity concerned, host 
governments, even after nationalization, 
will have to sell their output to the 
handful of transnational corporations 
controlling the industry. If nationaliza-
tion does not take place, the export 
price is essentially a tranfer price 
between two subsidiaries of the same 
company. It can, therefore, be arbitrarily 
set by the company, which is aiming at 
profit maximization at the global rather 
than at the subsidiary level. 
Finally, information is a very im-
portant source of strength. For ex-
ample, if a government knows the 
'hurdle rate' of return to the company it 
can impose heavy taxation on profits in 
excess of this return, as they represent 
economic income. Unfortunately, this 
hurdle rate is often a closely-guarded 
secret, although instances can be cited of 
successful renegotiations due mainly to 
the information on it possessed by the 
host government (e.g., the case of the 
Jamaican bauxite levy). 
To move from essentially static to 
medium-term conditions, the changes 
over time in bargaining positions can be 
discussed at two levels: the project level 
and the general level. 
At the project level it is generally 
observed that the bargaining position of 
host governments is weakest before the 
project starts. This is especially the case 
in big mining projects, as the first stage 
involves risk capital for large-scale 
exploration expenditure which the tras-
national corporation can supply. Once 
the corporation has sunk substantial 
amounts of capital, which is frozen over 
the short term, the bargaining position 
tilts in favour of the host governments, 
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to which the original terms of the 
agreement may come to appear exces-
sively generous. They may then intro-
duce new tax laws, or tighten the control 
and regulation provisions within the 
existing agreement, or demand the 
renegotiation of the original contract. 
The balance of bargaining power may 
eventually swing back in favour of the 
transnational corporation at the time 
when it is considering a further large 
investment outlay, until the new bargain 
again becomes obsolete. This cyclical 
pattern of the bargaining process has 
been described by Raymond Vernon as 
the "obsolescing bargain".19 
Analysing the dynamic changes 
which have taken place at the global 
level, one can observe that the cyclical 
trend described above oscillates around a 
secular trend in which host governments 
have continuously managed to streng-
then and improve their bargaining 
position vis-á-vis the transnational corpo-
rations. This is reflected in the ability of 
host governments to conclude agree-
ments with increasingly better terms and 
conditions or to apply to existing 
projects policy measures such as renego-
tiations or nationalization, all of which 
have shifted the distribution of gains 
unmistakably in favour of the govern-
ments concerned. 
Among all the factors listed above, 
three in particular have contributed to 
19
 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay, 
New York, Basic Books, 1971, pp. 46 et seq. 
For a distinction between the bargaining power 
of host governments at the pre-exploration, 
pre-exploitation and post-execution stages of a 
mining project, see Rex Bosson and Bension 
Varon, The Mining Industry and the Developing 
Countries, World Bank Research Publication 
Series, Oxford, University Press, 1977, pp. 
137-139. See also Theodore Moran, "Economic 
Nationalism and the Copper Industry", De-
velopment Digest, vol. XIV, no. 3, July 1976. 
this trend: the improving international 
climate in favour of Third World 
participation in global economic activi-
ties; the improvement in the negotiating 
skills of host countries; and the emergen-
ce of new industrial powers with their 
own independent corporations chal-
lenging the supremacy of the handful of 
companies controlling each commodity. 
These three factors are discussed below. 
In the past, it was taken for granted 
that colonies and peripheral countries 
should specialize in the production of 
raw materials and cheap foodstuffs for 
the metropolitan countries. The dyna-
mism generated by commodity flows 
from the peripheral countries and 
colonies was felt mostly in the metropo-
litan countries where the whole decision-
making process with respect to pro-
cessing, manufacturing and marketing of 
the commodities was concentrated, 
while the commodity-producing coun-
tries were relegated to the position of 
dependent entities. Whatever dynamism 
trickled down to them was very often 
confined to the foreign-oriented export-
enclaves. 
Private capital investment played an 
all-important role in this international 
division of labour between the metro-
polis and the periphery. Until the late 
nineteenth century, Western Europe's 
main interest in the colonies was as a 
source of cheap foodstuffs and agricultu-
ral materials. Private companies, some of 
them possessing in embryo the characte-
ristics of today's giant corporations, 
developed the plantation economy and 
the trading facilities to satisfy these 
metropolitan needs. At the beginning of 
the twentieth century a new dimension 
was introduced into this typical relation-
ship. As the industrial sector in Western 
Europe and Japan expanded rapidly and 
domestic sources of fuels and minerals 
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were swiftly depleted, these countries 
embarked upon an aggressive overseas 
search for fuels and minerals. 
In this search, too, private companies 
played a major part, and the era 
witnessed the birth of the fuily-
integrated company with the establish-
ment of Royal Dutch Shell in 1907, 
followed by other petroleum companies 
and companies engaged in prospecting 
for all the major metals of those days: 
copper, tin, bauxite and iron ore. 
Although the United States had always 
been relatively self-sufficient in these 
basic materials, to the extent that the 
country did require overseas supplies its 
companies not only participated in this 
worldwide hunt for fuels and minerals 
but were often in the lead. 
The international climate was heavily 
weighted against the colonies and peri-
pheral countries. The 'host governments' 
in the colonies were colonial administra-
tions having the same objective as the 
transnational corporations: namely, to 
ensure the regular, orderly and cheap 
flows of raw materials and foodstuffs 
needed by the metropolis, with little 
regard for the economic needs of the 
local population in the colonies. Even in 
the case of the independent peripheral 
countries of Latin America, the bar-
gaining position of transnational corpo-
rations, often backed by powerful home 
governments, was very strong and, at the 
same time, that of host governments 
very weak. The second factor explaining 
this weakness in those days was the 
complete ignorance of host governments 
regarding their natural resources, and 
their lack of experience in dealing with 
complicated issues such as mining 
contracts. Host governments had to rely 
entirely on company reports on the 
nature and extent of their natural 
wealth, to their obvious disadvantage, 
and corporations could virtually dictate 
the terms and conditions of the contract. 
The international climate has 
changed considerably, especially since 
the Second World War. The political 
emancipation and decolonization which 
took place in the 1950s and 1960s have 
created independent countries out of 
erstwhile colonies. Transnational corpora-
tions now have to deal with host 
governments instead of colonial adminis-
trations. 
However, the new nations very soon 
found out, as had their fellow Third 
World countries in Latin America long 
before, that political independence did 
not automatically bring about economic 
independence. Improved international 
communications, coupled with the in-
creasing skills of bureaucratic machinery 
and the growing awareness of the 
intelligentsia in the Third World, fed by a 
swelling flow of university graduates 
(often from universities in the home 
countries of the transnational corpora-
tions), have stepped up the collective 
bargaining power of host governments. 
The countries of the Third World realize 
that economic independence cannot be 
achieved if they plod on in their 
marginal role of providers of raw 
materials for the metropolis and con-
tinue to receive only a minute portion of 
the total gains derived from their 
commodity exports. 
Third World solidarity and aware-
ness, as demonstrated in the many 
existing international forums, have con-
tributed significantly to these changes in 
the international climate. In addition, 
improvements in international communi-
cations have enabled host countries to 
learn from one another's experience so 
that new agreements will have better 
terms and conditions than old ones. The 
successive waves of nationalizations and 
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renegotiations are mutually reinforcing, 
and often have repercussions on rela-
tionships in the same industry elsewhere 
or even in other industries. 
An important factor in the decline of 
oligopoly power has been the emergence 
of numerous independent companies, 
some of them fully-integrated transna-
tional corporations, others purveyors of 
separate services such as technology, and 
still others State enterprises. This is a 
consequence of the multipolarization of 
world economic power among the 
countries of Western Europe, the Socia-
list countries and Japan in the 1960s and 
1970s, with its challenge to the post-war 
economic supremacy of the United 
States. This does not mean, of course, 
that the older companies have declined 
in absolute importance. On the contrary, 
through continuous mergers, consolida-
tion and vertical and horizontal integra-
tion, these companies have individually 
all become statistically stronger. Howe-
ver, there is no doubt that the relative 
share of the oligopolies in production 
and exports of most commodities has 
declined over time. 
2. The bargaining process 
(box B) 
Given the bargaining situation, the 
success of a government in maximizing 
gains derived from primary commodity 
exports will largely depend on the skill 
with which it exploits its bargaining 
position. Several stages can be distingui-
shed in the bargaining process between 
the transnational corporation and the 
host government. Stage one takes place 
prior to the initiation of a new project. 
Here the bargaining process will establish 
the terms and conditions of the agree-
ment, which in turn will determine the 
distribution of gains from the project. In 
contemporary agreements, the terms and 
conditions agreed upon include such 
issues as transfer prices, the kind of 
technology to be used and its cost, tax 
and royalty rates and tax reporting 
techniques, concessions and the time 
limit involved, management and patent 
fees, the structure of debt and owner-
ship, including the extent of local 
participation, local processing require-
ments and local purchases of goods and 
services. 
Once the project is in process of 
execution by the transnational corpora-
tion, the government, exercising its 
regulatory and control functions, will 
attempt to ensure that the actual gains 
derived are in accordance with previous-
ly agreed-upon terms and conditions. It 
may pass new tax or other laws affecting 
the distribution of gains, within the 
confines of the original agreement. If, 
however, it demands significant changes, 
such as the imposition of a new 
production levy or equity participation 
in the companies concerned, or other 
issues are raised requiring changes in the 
original provisions of the agreement, the 
bargaining process enters its second 
stage, i.e., the renegotiation of the 
agreement. Renegotiations are nowadays 
quite common in the relationship be-
tween host government and transnational 
corporation, in view of the changing 
bargaining position described at length in 
the previous section. 
When renegotiations break down, the 
government may decide to nationalize 
the facilities owned by the transnational 
corporation. Nationalization may occur 
without previous attempts at renegotia-
tion, which is the case if a government 
decides to resort to it either as a matter 
of principle, or on an ad hoc basis at 
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the prompting of given events. Unless 
nationalization is accompanied by con-
fiscation, it will entail a certain type of 
negotiations as well, which may be 
labelled stage three of the process; they 
will centre on the issue of compensation 
payments, but will often also include 
negotiations on a new relationship 
between the two parties, i.e., the signing 
of management, technology or mar-
keting contracts. Nationalization of a 
dependent "cell" or subsidiary will not 
necessarily be followed by a severance of 
all ties with the transnational corpora-
tion network. 
3. The agreement and the distribution 
of gains (box C) 
Turning now to the volume of distribu-
tion of gains itself, this study will 
employ the concept of retained value as 
a basis for measuring the distribution of 
gains. Under this concept, the gains to 
the host country ?.re measured as the 
sum total of all components of foreign-
exchange export earnings which are 
retained in the country. Table 1 shows 
that in the case of the traditional 
agreement, the most important compo-
nents are: (a) wages and salaries; (b) 
domestic purchases of goods and servi-
ces;20 (c) the government's share of 
revenues (royalties, taxes, levies, divi-
dends); (d) reinvested profits. 
Table 1 also shows that the contem-
porary agreement has two components. 
One is the gross value of exports (XR), 
where the distribution of gains problems 
are of course, identical with those of the 
traditional agreement, i.e., XR = RV + 
2 0
 Defined net of import content of local 
purchases. Import content may be very large, 
especially in small countries with a narrow 
industrial base. 
OP. The second component deals with 
the gains from forward linkage activities. 
If the government succeeds in trans-
ferring the later-stage processing activi-
ties -refining, smelting and eventually 
manufacturing— to the host country, but 
continues, to rely on transnational 
corporations for the operation of the 
activities in question, additional distribu-
tive implications emerge. Here again, the 
components of retained value become 
important. Governments are also inte-
rested in securing shares in lucrative 
operations such as shipping, marketing 
and distribution, which are carried 
on outside the host country and would 
presumably yield foreign exchange re-
venues. The important magnitudes are 
not the gross margins accruing from 
these operations, but the net surplus 
gains that the host country can earn from 
engaging in such activities.21 
The concept of retained value 
employed in this study has been applied 
by Mikesell in case studies on copper, 
petroleum and other products.22 It is by 
no means the only way to calculate the 
nation's benefits; it is perhaps not even 
the best, as it suffers from various 
defects such as the inability to compute 
social opportunity cost and the social 
rate of discount. Nevertheless, from the 
standpoint of host government policy, it 
is a useful approach for comparing 
alternative means of developing a pro-
ject. Furthermore, estimation problems 
at the case study level due to lack of 
data would prevent the use of a more 
2
 * See the introduction to this paper. 
2 2
 See Raymond F. Mikesell, Foreign 
Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral 
Industries, Resources for the Future, Inc., The 
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971; and by 
the same author, Foreign Investment in Copper 
Mining, Resources for the Future, Inc., The 
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 3975. 
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Table 1 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF GAINS UNDER THE TWO TYPES 
OF AGREEMENT 
The traditional agreement3 The contemporary agreement3-
A. Components of gross export revenues 
<XR): 
1. Components of retained value of 
exports (RV) 
(a) Wa;.;s and salaries (W) 
(b) Domestic purchases of goods and 
services (DP)'5 
(c) Government's share of revenues 
(GR). 
(d) Reinvested profits (RP) 
2. Components of outflow payments 
(OP) 
(a) Imports of goods and services, 
including invisibles such as pa-
tents and licences (MGS) 
(b) Salaries of expatriates accruing 
abroad (SE) 
(c) Loan repayments abroad, includ-
ing interest (LP) 
(d) Corporate profits transferred 
abroad (TP) 
X R - R V + OP (1) 
Components of the distribution of gains 
from final consumer value (FCV) 
A. Components of gross export revenues: 
same as under the traditional agreement 
(XR) 
XR=RV + (OP) (1) 
B. Components of forward linkage activities 
(FL) 
(a) Refining and smelting (or ripening in 
the case of foodstuffs such as 
bananas) 
(b) Manufacturing 
(c) Shipping and insurance 
(d) Marketing and distribution 
FCV = XR + FL (2) 
aSee diagram 1 for an explanation of these two types of agreement. 
^DP is defined net of the import content of domestic purchases. 
sophisticated measure of the distribution 
of gains, such as the concept of net 
present value of the investment project 
developed by Mikessell, McKern and 
Kindleberger.23 In the latter concept, 
the time element is taken into account 
by introducing an appropriate social rate 
of discount. In addition, the equation 
includes such measures as the social 
value of external economies and the 
social opportunity cost of domestic 
inputs, all of which are difficult to 
estimate. 
Table 1 simplifies the picture in that 
it assumes an ongoing project earning 
foreign exchange from exports. This 
makes it possible to calculate, on an 
annual basis, how the export earnings are 
2 3
 Charles P. Kindleberger, "Direct 
Foreign Investment in Economic Develop-
ment", in Direct Investment in Asia and the 
Pacific (Peter Drysdale, ed.), University of 
Toronto Press, 1972. For further elaboration of 
the concept, see Raymond F. Mikesell, 
"Foreign Direct Investment in External Finan-
cing", paper presented at the Conference on 
External Financial Policies, sponsored by OAS 
and the Central Bank of Chile, Santiago, March 
1977. See also Bruce McKern, Multinational 
Enterprise and Natural Resources, Australia, 
McGraw Hill, 1976, pp. 23-33. 
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distributed among the various agents: 
the transnational corporation, the host 
government and others. 
A key element in the negotiations is 
the determination of direct gains, or 
gains in the narrower sense of the word, 
i.e., the surplus accruing from the 
project. Since surplus is the difference 
between revenue and cost, its size will 
depend on the method by which the 
various items determining these two 
magnitudes are calculated. The methods 
of calculation are often a major source 
of conflict. Primary export projects 
involve complicated inflow and outflow 
transactions between various subsidiaries 
of the transnational corporation, and the 
calculation of cost and revenue therefore 
depends very much on the corporation's 
transfer pricing practices. 
In order to obtain a better unders-
tanding of the relationship between the 
investment of the transnational corpora-
tion and the surplus generated by the 
project, the project's balance-of-
payments flow must be traced from its 
beginning. This is done in table 2, which 
distinguishes between the two phases of 
each project: the initial investment or 
pre-exportation period and the sus-
tained-exportation period. In both pe-
riods inflow payments are equal to the 
retained value plus outflow payments 
(IP = RV + OP (1)). 
The pre-exportation period varies 
from project to project. In the mining 
and petroleum sectors, it will include the 
exploration period, during which the 
corporation brings in equity or loan 
capital for high-risk activities which may 
turn out to be unsuccessful. On this 
investment, therefore, the company 
expects a higher than normal rate of 
return, which it will recover in the form 
of profits when the project starts 
production. Even if the activity is less 
risky, as in the case of banana 
plantations, there will be an initial 
period in which expenditure is made and 
nothing is earned. Very often the inflow 
is in the form not of cash but of heavy 
machinery, drilling equipment, etc., so 
that the inflow item is automatically 
offset by the import item. During this 
period, the main components of retained 
value are wages and salaries (W) and 
domestic purchases of goods and services 
(DP). 
In Phase II, the sustained-exporta-
tion period, the problem of the distribu-
tion of gains will loom up in earnest, as 
there are foreign exchange earnings from 
exports to be divided. Corporations 
often justify their high rate of profits, or 
returns, on the grounds that they have to 
write off expenditure incurred in Phase I 
and take into account the high-risk 
activities undertaken during that phase. 
While this may be true, it is difficult in 
practice to estimate the magnitudes of a 
just return for risks undertaken in Phase 
I, because of the use of transfer pricing 
and because the corporation maximized 
returns on a global scale. A government 
will find it hard to understand that 
against earnings from exports of its own 
country's products a company will write 
off unsuccessfull investment in another 
country. 
Conceptually speaking, the ability of 
governments to capture the direct gains 
from export activities is related to the 
various categories of economic returns 
within the overall gains. It is useful to 
distinguish between three types of 
economic returns which accrue from 
primary commodity exports: 
1. Resource income, first introduced 
by Ricardo many years ago in agricul-
ture. Today this concept is much more 
applicable to mining, especially when 
differences in the quality and in the 
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Table 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF GAINS DURING THE TWO PHASES OF THE 
INVESTMENT PROJECT 
Inflow payments (IP) Retained value (R V) Outflow payments (OP) 
Phase I: The initial investment period 
1. Transfers from transna- 1. Wages and salaries (W) 
tional corporation's head-
quarters (THQ) 
(a) equity capital (EC) 2. Local purchases of plant, 
(cash and subordinated equipment goods and ser-
loans) vices8 (DP) 
(b)debt (foreign loans) 3. Changes in cash balances 
(DE) in local banks (CLB) 
1. Imports of goods and 
services, including designs, 
blueprints, etc, (MGS) 
2. Salaries of expatriates ac-
cruing abroad (SE) 
3. Changes in cash balances 
in foreign banks (CFB) 
4. Interest payments (IP) 
Phase II: The sustained-exportation period: operating results in year i 
1. Export revenues (XR) 1. Wages and salaries (W) 
2. Transfers from transna- 2. Local purchases of goods 
tional corporation's head- and services (DP) 
quarters (THQ); same as 1 
(a) and (b) under Phase I 
3. Government's share of re-
venues (GR) 
4. Retained earnings and de-
preciation reinvested or in 
local banks (RP) 
1. Imports of goods and 
services, including royal-
ties, patents, licences, etc. 
(MGS) 
2. Salaries of expatriates ac-
cruing abroad (SE) 
3. Profits and depreciation 
transferred abroad (TP) 
4. Debt amortization (DA) 
aDefined net of import content. 
Note: In both periods: IP-RV +OP (1). 
accessibility of mineral deposits produce 
differential resource incomes; 
2. Quasi-income. This type of in-
come is earned by factors of production 
brought into combination by the trans-
national corporation, such as capital and 
technology. It also includes the services 
of experts, which, owing to the oligopo-
lic position of managers, are not readily 
available; 
3. Monopolistic and monopsonistic 
income accrued. Since perfect competi-
tion does not exist in primary-com-
modity trade, oligopolies controlling the 
barriers to entry earn these types of 
income on the buyer and seller sides. 
In practice, it is difficult for a host 
government to identify the three kinds 
of income and demand a share of each 
type. Usually, quasi-income is shown 
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among the cost items of the transnation-
al corporations and will be part of the 
outflow payments. Attempts to capture 
such forms of income are difficult, but a 
tax on licence fees, for example, has 
been introduced successfully by some 
countries. 
For obvious reasons the differential 
resource incomes are the most easily 
captured by host governments earning 
them. Finally, the burden of the recent 
successes of governments in demanding a 
larger share of the gains from oil and 
bauxite has been shifted by the trans-
national corporations on to the con-
sumers, allowing both host governments 
and transnational corporations jointly to 
maximize the monopolistic income 
gained in these industries.24 
Nowadays, the distinction between 
the two types of agreement is rapidly 
disappearing. Between the two extremes 
- i.e., a host government receiving a 
minimal share of earnings under a 
traditional type of agreement and a 
government which participates in all 
activities, including forward linkage, in 
the shape, for example, of a fully-inte-
grated nationalized firm—, a wide range 
of variations on the basic theme has 
come into existence, especially with the 
proliferation of new types of agreements 
replacing the traditional foreign-direct-
investment package, such as joint ven-
24
 The income concepts are from a paper 
by Helen Hughes, "The Distribution of Gains 
from Foreign Direct Investment in Mineral 
Development", Southeast Asia Development 
Advisory Group, Papers on Development 
Problems in Southeast Asia, New York, The 
Asia Society (mimeographed) 1974. For an 
analysis of the incidence of new taxes or levies 
introduced by governments, see Malcolm Gillis 
and Charles E. MeLure, Jr., "The Distri-
butional Implications of the Taxation of 
Natural Resources", Rice University Studies, 
Houston, Texas, vol. 61, no. 4, Fall 1975. 
tures, turn-key operations, management 
or technology ^contracts, production-
sharing agreements, etc. 
The host government, during the 
negotiations, will not merely confine 
itself to the narrower question of 
distribution of direct gains, i.e., of how 
to capture its share of surplus or 
economic returns. It will also be 
concerned with increasing indirect gains, 
i.e., the shares falling to the other 
domestic agents (wages and salaries and 
domestic purchases of goods and ser-
vices), and, under the contemporary 
type of agreement, with the forward-
linkage effects of the project. In other 
words, the total impact on development 
depends not only on the magnitude of 
the retained value, but also, to a more 
important extent, on its composition, 
which determines the strength of the 
various linkages described in the fol-
lowing pages. 
Better control and regulation of 
existing stipulations in the agreement as 
to proportions of local personnel, of 
domestic purchases of goods and ser-
vices, and of processing in the host 
country, will often yield considerable 
increases in indirect gains, i.e., in the 
country's share of the gains accruing 
from various components of retained 
value of exports. If the agreements is of 
the traditional type or is strongly biased 
in favour of the corporation, only drastic 
renegotiations of the contract or natio-
nalization can resolve the problem of 
increasing the host country's primary-
export earnings. 
It is useful to clarify further the 
impact of distribution of gains on 
economic development. This is impor-
tant in view of the fact that discussion 
on gains from transnational corporations 
is often coloured by conceptual con-
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fusion, which renders it meaningless to 
policy-makers. 
Since this paper deals with an 
export-oriented sector, the discussion 
should logically concentrate on the 
financial gains derived from export 
projects. It would be beyond the scope of 
this paper to introduce issues such as 
effect on employment, income distribu-
tion, choice of investments, or environ-
ment, all of which are, of course, of 
great importance in the actual reper-
cussions of projects on economic develop-
ment. Nevertheless, it seems useful to 
dwell on the various development 
effects of the investment project, as its 
global impact on development depends 
on their strengths and weaknesses. In 
this regard, the system of generalized 
linkages worked out by Hirschman and 
others will be a useful guide.25 The 
concepts of forward and backward 
linkages of investment introduced by 
Hirschman are now well-know in eco-
nomic development literature.26 The 
linkage effects of a given product line 
have been defined by Hirschman as 
investment-generating forces that are set 
in motion through input-output relation-
ships. Backward linkages refer to pur-
chases of domestic goods and services on 
the part of an investment project, 
leading to new investments by the 
suppliers.27 Forward linkages refer to 
investment in output-using facilities, or 
the downstream integration of the 
2 5
 The following discussion draws heavily 
on Albert O. Hirschman. "A Generalized 
Linkage Approach to Development, with 
special reference to Staples", Economic De-
velopment and Cultural Change, vol. 25, 
Supplement, 1977. 
2 6
 Albert O. Hirschman, Strategy of 
Economic Development, New Haven, Connec-
ticut, Yale University Press, 1958. 
27
 DP in tables 1 and 2. 
project in processing, manufacturing, 
marketing and distribution.28 These 
may be called production linkages, and 
are of the greatest concern to host govern-
ments in negotiations with transnational 
corporations. 
In addition, host governments should 
take into consideration what Hirschman 
calls the consumption and fiscal linkages 
of the investment project. Both of these 
relate to the income aspect of the 
export-oriented project. The consump-
tion linkage works as follows: new 
incomes generated by the production 
and export of primary commodities may 
initially be spent on imports, but a 
consumption linkage is considered posi-
tive if these imports, once they have 
grown to a sufficient volume, can 
eventually be replaced by domestic 
manufactures. Of course, the consump-
tion linkage may be negative if imported 
consumer goods compete against domes-
tic products and price them out of the 
market. 
The fiscal linkage relates to the fiscal 
revenue generated by exports of primary 
commodities. While host governments 
are primarily interested in increasing 
their share of the economic returns on 
exports of primary commodities, the 
ultimate impact on economic develop-
ment will depend upon whether the 
government spends the revenue on 
productive investment, i.e., upon the 
existence of the fiscal linkage. Of course, 
the bigger the pie, the more likely it is 
that at least part of it will go to feed 
productive investment. 
It often happens that one kind of 
linkage is to be had only at the expense 
of another. Thus, fiscal linkages have 
made a strong showing in mining and 
petroleum activities which have all the 
2 8
 FL in table 1. 
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earmarks of an "enclave". If the enclave 
is defined as the absence of involvement 
with the rest of the economy, it 
automatically implies absence of the 
consumer and production linkages. 
A small country receiving huge 
amounts of tax revenue from petroleum 
exports, for instance, will be less 
concerned with promoting forward and 
backward linkages. The consumption 
linkage may also be absent if the high 
propensity to import proves self-sus-
taining and no encouragement is af-
forded to domestic industry. The only 
consumption linkage may be the im-
provement of port and highway facilities 
to cope with the astronomical rise in 
imports. 
It would exceed the scope of this 
paper to follow through in greater detail 
the workings of the various linkages. 
With exception of those relating to 
production, i.e., forward and backward 
linkages, which are of direct concern in 
negotiations with transnational corpora-
tions, the other linkages are more closely 
connected with domestic policies and 
with the multiplier effect. 
C. Summary 
The broad conceptual framework set 
forth above will serve as a general guide 
for case studies in this field of enquiry. 
In each case study, modifications will 
have to be made in the broad terms of 
reference propounded in this paper. 
Nevertheless, certain common hypothe-
ses developed in this framework will 
have to be tested in all the case studies, 
so that a comparative study can be made 
in the future. The basic hypotheses 
presented include the following: 
1. During the past twenty-five years, 
there has been a significant change in 
the distribution of gains in favour of 
host governments and countries; 
2. The improvement in the distribution 
of gains is a direct result of the 
strengthening of the relative bar-
gaining position of host govern-
ments; 
3. The relative bargaining position is 
determined by the mutual interac-
tion of four sets of factors, namely, 
(a) the host governments, (b) the 
transnational corporations, (c) the 
nature of the commodity and (d) the 
international climate; 
4. The list of the four sets of factors 
tabulated in the paper should be 
used as a checklist by researchers 
undertaking the case studies. The use 
of a common checklist for these 
studies will enable general conclu-
sions about the relative importance 
of certain factors to be drawn; 
5. Basically, the government can influ-
ence the distribution of gains in its 
favour through negotiations with the 
transnational corporations; 
6. Negotiations take place at various 
points in time. Before the initiation 
of a project, negotiations are con-
ducted to conclude an agreement. 
After the project has been executed, 
renegotiations may take place to 
alter the terms and conditions of the 
contract. Finally, should the govern-
ment decide to nationalize the 
subsidiary of the transnational cor-
porations, negotiations may take 
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place regarding compensation and 
perhaps marketing or other arrange-
ments; 
7. There exist considerable variations of 
the basic model above, In the case of 
small projects, negotiations may not 
take place at all, as corporations may 
execute a project under a standard 
contract or an implicit agreement. 
Automatic renegotiations will take 
place from time to time if govern-
ments decide to alter the basic 
contracts and the rules and regulations 
governing foreign investment; 
8. With regard to the content of the 
agreement, two types of agreement 
can be distinguished: (a) the tradi-
tional agreement, which is concerned 
with the distribution of a given 
f.o.b. export value, and (b) the 
contemporary agreement, which is 
concerned with increasing the export 
value through forward linkage ef-
fects; 
9. A distinction can be made between 
(a) direct gains, i.e., the surplus 
generated by export activities, and 
(b) indirect gains, i.e., the retained 
value accruing to domestic agents of 
the export project other than the 
government (domestic purchases of 
goods and services, and wages and 
salaries, as well as profits reinvested 
by the corporation); 
10. Direct gains: governments are in-
terested both in their percentage 
share and in the volume of the 
surplus, since the latter is determined 
by such negotiable factors as transfer 
pricing and depreciation practices; 
11. Indirect gains: governments can 
influence the value of indirect gains 
by introducing laws requiring more 
extensive use of local personnel and 
of local goods and services, or others 
requiring government and host-coun-
try participation in forward-linkage 
activities associated with its primary 
commodity exports (such as pro-
cessing, marketing, shipping, distrib-
ution and financing). 
